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ADDITIONAL METHODS TO DETECT TRAIN 
INTEGRITY UNDER ETCS LEVEL 3 AND THE 
EFFECTS ON CAPACITY AND CONTROL OF 
MOVEMENT  
Sebastian Schön1, Constanze Streitzig2 
ETCS Level 3 – today the highest level of ETCS – relies on train-side detection of train-
integrity. This paper elaborates on newly designed alternatives for detection of train-integrity. 
The fundamental safety targets of German train protection systems served as a basis for the 
presented alternatives. We compare these alternatives to the effects on capacity at lines and 
different kinds of stations. Furthermore we show the positive effect to control of shunting 
movements and parked vehicles. In addition the effects to the start-up and sign-in process of 
traction vehicles and the use as a fall-back level are shown. 
1. Motivation
To resolve numerous constraints in cross-border rail traffic ([1] & [2]) the
implementation of and research on the European Rail Traffic Management System 
(ERTMS) is under way. One mayor activity is the specification and implementation 
of the European Train Control System (ETCS). ETCS Level 3 – today the highest 
level of ETCS – relies on train-side detection of train-integrity [3]. This, in 
combination with other components of ETCS, enables to consider driving in moving 
block. Positive effects on capacity are anticipated but at most a more cost efficient 
infrastructure without components for track-side detection of train-integrity is 
hoped-for. 
Until today the sole implementation of ETCS Level 3 is the West Dalarna Line 
in Sweden. The implemented derivate of ETCS Level 3 is known as “ERTMS 
Regional” [4]. The experiences gained in this project are crucial for the further – not 
yet finished ([5] & [6]) – specification process of ETCS Level 3. This on-going 
process is one reason for European infrastructure managers to hold back an ETCS 
Level 3 implementation ([7] & [8]), despite the anticipated positive effects. 
The presented research aims for a concept to integrate alternative methods to 
detect train-integrity into ETCS Level 3. Of course the finalized concept should 
allow safe train operations but in addition the concept should allow an increased 
number of train operations at lines and at different kinds of stations. The aim of the 
research was therefore to allow an increase of capacity and to improve the control of 
shunting movements and parked vehicles.  
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2. Methodology
Our research started with a comparison of the most common used German train
protection systems (PZB & LZB) and ETCS Level 3. Basic requirements and safety 
targets, which are inherent in the national train protection systems, are identified:  
 Information for the train driver
 Warning of the train driver
 Control of the alertness of the train driver
 Triggering the emergency brake
 Carrying out the emergency brake to the stop of the train
 Preventing the unauthorized movement of a train
The last three identified safety targets served as a basis for the creation of three
alternative concepts to detect train-integrity. These concepts are compared to ETCS 
Level 3 with focus on the effects on capacity and the additional costs for different 
kind of stations. The alternatives that were further analysed are shown in the table 
below: 
Tab. 1 Alternative concepts 
concept example 
Pure ETCS Level 3 
ETCS Level 3 & conventional track-side 
detection of train-integrity at selected switches 
ETCS Level 3 & track-side checkpoints for 
end-of-train-detection  
(i.e. automated video-based detection) 
ETCS Level 3 & radar detection at stations 
These alternatives rely on additional track-side components, a renunciation from 
pure ETCS Level 3. The additional track-side components for end-of-train-detection 
or continuous detection of train movements can be placed at selected locations of the 
track field of stations. These components should allow for accelerated train 
movements (including shunting movements). In order to compare these alternatives 
the obstruction of subsequent trains through reduced speeds when entering into 
siding was evaluated. 
S. Schön, C. Streitzig 
Additional Methods to Detect Train Integrity under ETCS Level 3 and the Effects on Capacity and Control of Movement 
204 
3. Capacity for regular operation
To evaluate these obstructions at first the capacity was evaluated. A double-track
line with two stations served as a basis. Both stations feature a siding. The selected 
timetable reflects typical a typical operation program and is destined to unveil 
conflicts at the switching zone of station B. 
Fig. 1: Track layout and timetable 
UIC Code 406 offers a method for capacity evaluations of lines with fixed 
blocks based on route occupancy but offers no recommendations for capacity 
evaluations of lines with moving blocks. The principles of blocking time stairways 
cannot be used for these lines. Consequently the UIC Code 406 cannot be used 
without further adjustments.  
The calculation of journey time is not affected. However the calculation the 
speed-depending braking operation is of particular interest, because the minimum 
headway time is calculated from the speed-depending braking distance and a safety 
distance. The algorithm described in UIC Code 544-1 offers an accurate method. 
EURO – ŽEL 2013 
 4th – 5th, June 2013, Žilina 
205 
Our model calls for a minimum clearance at any given time in front of the train 
composed of the current braking distance and a proportionate safety distance. The 
proportionate safety distance is selected to 20 % of the current braking distance. 
Switches have to have safely reached their final position before a movement 
authority can be issued beyond the position of the switch. The evaluation of capacity 
is based on the assumption that switches reach their final position, are locked and 
that this state is safely communicated via the Radio Block Centre to the train in total 
within 0.2 min. A future technical solution with or without a signal box shall not be 
discussed in this paper. 
The timing of the vacancy notification of track elements is dependent on the 
chosen time interval of the position reports of the train [9]. ETCS Level 3 stipulates 
a fixed interval. With the aid of the presented additional track-side components for 
end-of-train-detection or continuous detection of train movements selected track 
elements can be notified as vacant prior to the next position report of the train. An 
acceleration of the operation would be expected. 
Only the first switch of station B was equipped with additional track-side 
components of capacity demonstrates in the evaluation. However, the above-
mentioned positive effect can be demonstrated. But, the effect is small. Compared to 
pure ETCS Level 3, the occupancy rate differs in a margin of 0.5 percentage points 
for the presented alternatives. The maximum achievable value is larger, but can only 
be achieved with trains of the same speed.  
The effects on the occupancy rate of decelerating trains on the track between 
stations A and B and the time of the position report of stopping trains in station B 
were far greater. For example the position report of a stopping train may be delayed 
by several seconds because of the fixed interval for position reports. An additional 
unscheduled position report at the actual time of stopping is not intended in ETCS 
Level 3. But such a measure would have positive effects on capacity. 
4. Costs and benefits for regular operation
To further compare the presented alternatives the additional costs were
determined. For three different kinds of stations with different functions in the rail-
network – a station with one siding, a terminal station and a junction station – the 
count of additional track-side components has been identified. The exact amount of 
money needed could not be determined, because some of the presented technologies 
have never been used for the intended purpose.  
For the model station with a single siding the track plan of the station 
“Mörfelden” served as a basis. A simple layout with one checkpoint for end-of-train-
detection suits the intended purpose. Because of the ideal-typical track plan of this 
station the insights gained about the positive effect can be easily transferred to other 
stations in the rail-network. 
For the model terminal station the track plan of the Wiesbaden main station 
served as a basis. With the help of a single radome the multiple conflicts between 
entering and leaving trains can easily be monitored in a terminal station. The crucial 
switches are concentrated in a confined space. Therefore vacant track elements can 
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be detected quickly and are disposal for upcoming trains. In addition the continuous 
surveillance of parked vehicles and shunting movements in storage sidings is 
possible. The loss of conventional track-side components for detection of train-
integrity, and maybe even the abandonment of protection switches and derailers can 
be compensated with this alternative concept. Movements that are not permitted can 
quickly be detected and a possible emergency stop order can be triggered. 
For the model junction station the track plan of the Darmstadt main station 
served as a basis. Because of the great amount of additional track-side components 
needed to equip all important switches the study concentrated on others subjects. 
The effects on shunting movements in confined spaces of the station that is 
necessary for the reinforcement of trains during peak times and the effects on 
directly afterwards departing trains are of particular interest. The execution of these 
time-critical shunting movements can be supported with the continuous detection of 
movements via radar technology. Additionally, parked vehicles can be monitored 
after the shunting movement. The abandonment of protection switches and derailers 
is a possibility for storage sidings in a confined space that can be monitored via 
radar technology. In summary, it can be stated that the surveillance of movements 
with the help of radar technology offers great advantages and several application 
scenarios are possible. 
5. Use as fall-back level
Through the use of various technologies of the developed alternatives a
complementary redundancy to train-side detection of train-integrity is achievable. A 
small number of checkpoints for end-of-train-detection could be provided alongside 
lines. Unlike pure ETCS Level 3 a greater capacity is maintained when the train-side 
means for detection of train-integrity fail or a non-equipped train is traveling on an 
ETCS Level 3 line. Especially the last-mentioned possibility is interesting, as the 
migration period will be rather long and non-equipped trains may travel on new 
lines that are only equipped with ETCS Level 3 [10]. 
6. Conclusions
 Further research on the functional and operational use of the presented
alternative concepts is needed
 The positive effects on capacity shown in this paper are small
 However a much greater effect in networks with similar trains (i.e. Metro-
systems) is expected
 Another capacity study should be conducted
 The control of Shunting Movements and parked vehicles is possible
 Radar technology offers the greatest advantages
 Further research on the implementation of radar technology in stations and
the detection of full trains compiled from different wagons is needed
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 Components of the presented alternative concepts can be used to safely detect
the position of traction vehicles during the start-up and sign-in process
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